ABSTRACT Utilizing the cloud storage services to replace the conventional storage paradigms in the Internet of Things is becoming popular due to the huge amount of data produced by users. However, guaranteeing data integrity on the cloud is challenging since data owners would lose control of the outsourced data when subscribing the cloud storage services. There have been a lot of Provable Data Possession and Proof of Retrievability schemes proposed to check the data integrity on the cloud. These schemes additionally address the data updating or retrievability problems. Nevertheless, the majority of existing schemes handle only one data block at a time when dealing with the data updates, which is inefficient for the real-time and highly secure services. In order to overcome the efficiency limitation, we propose a new scheme to support the simultaneous updates of multiple data blocks. Specifically, a balanced data structure-SGMHT-an extension of the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) based on scapegoat tree, is constructed for the proposed goal of the scheme. The scheme also employs an erasure-coded hierarchical log structure to support the delayed update of multiple blocks and the data retrievability. In addition, homomorphic tags are used to reduce the amount of data transmission and enhance the efficiency of data updates. We formally analyze the security of the proposed scheme. The results of the experiments show that our scheme outperforms the existing schemes that are addressing the single block updates in terms of efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet of Things (IoT) technology, the deployments of IOT infrastructures and devices like mobile phones, sensors, and smart grids are enlarging. Massive data are produced rapidly by these IoT devices, which puts great pressures on the conventional data storage systems [5] - [8] . Therefore, cloud storage service has become increasingly popular for the data storage of IoT systems due to their low cost, high resource utilization and flexible extendibility [1] - [4] . As of May 2017, there are over two trillion files stored on the cloud, which is expect to expand largely in the future.
By utilizing cloud storage, massive data can be outsourced to the cloud and data owners can enjoy the storage service without maintaining any local copies, which enables storage or computation capability limited clients or devices (like IoT devices) to subscribe high quality storage services. However, there yet exists some tricky issues with the cloud storage. One of the toughest issues is the data integrity on the cloud since users actually hand over the control of their outsourced data to the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) when they subscribe storage service from the cloud. CSP is an untrusted server, which may hide the occasional data loss and errors from the clients for the reputation of their own or even delete users' rarely accessed data to reduce the maintenance costs. Consequently, integrity checking of the outsourced data is of great importance. Another major concern is the supporting of dynamic updates of the data in the cloud such as data deletion, data insertion and data modification, which are absolutely necessary for the users. Meanwhile, frequently updating the data in the cloud requires large computing and transmission costs. Therefore, how to efficiently support the updates of the data in the could is a critical issue to be addressed.
Many schemes tacking the integrity checking issue have been proposed, which can be divided into two categories according to the security level provided by these schemes. One is Provable Data Possession (PDP) and the other is Proof of Retrievability (POR). Both of them utilize random sampling and request-and-response mechanisms to periodically verify the integrity of some random data blocks stored by cloud. The main difference is that POR schemes can recover the lost data blocks by using the error-correcting codes, which provides a higher security level. However the error-correcting codes degrade the efficiency of the schemes since recoding processes are conducted upon each dynamical operation.
Each dynamical operation often involves many contiguous data blocks since all the data files in the cloud are divided into smaller fixed-size blocks for storing. Most of the existing schemes handle only one data block at a time [9] - [15] , which causes the updating time to increase linearly. Therefore, the applications that involve massive data blocks updating each time are inefficient by using these one-block updating approaches. Hence, the study of provable data integrity with simultaneous updates of multiple data blocks is of great importance.
In recent years, several cloud-based data update schemes have been proposed [9] - [17] , specifically, Wang et al. [10] used the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) to support data modification, insertion and deletion, however, they were unable to maintain the balance of the MHT after data update. Later, Erway et al. [11] used a skip list to extend the MHT scheme. Both of these approaches are Provable Data Possession (PDP) schemes, which do not support the retrievability of user data. Shi et al. [12] proposed a practical, dynamic Proof of Retrievability (POR) scheme that could achieve comparable bandwidth overhead, but unfortunately it is limited to updating single data block.
To achieve simultaneous updates of multiple blocks and compact storage space, we propose the Provable Data Integrity of Cloud Storage Service with Enhanced Security scheme. The contributions of the scheme are summarized as follows.
• First, a balanced data structure-SGMHT (an extension of the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) based on scapegoat tree) is proposed to enable simultaneously updating of multiple data blocks.
• Second, an erasure-coded hierarchical log structure that supports delay updating and data retrievability for multiple blocks is demonstrated.
• Third, homomorphic tags are used in the scheme to further improve the efficiency of data updates.
• Finally, the experimental and safety analyses are performed to verify the efficiency and security of the scheme.
II. RELATED WORK
A series of provable data integrity schemes have been proposed in recent years. According to their respective design goals, they can be generally divided into two categories, namely, the PDP, which mainly focuses on efficiently verifying the authenticity of the data, and the POR, which is designed to support the retrievability of the user's data.
A. PDP SCHEMES
The first PDP scheme was proposed by Ateniese et al. [18] . In such scheme, the file stored on the remote storage server consisted of multiple data blocks, each of which used RSA public-key cryptography based homomorphic verifiable tags. This scheme achieved constant cost for data verification via the challenge-response model and random sampling, but only for static data.
There have been several subsequent PDP-based schemes developed to date. For example, Ateniese et al. [19] later built a PDP scheme which could support public authentication.
Today's users demand dynamic operations for data stored on the remote server, a demand that is supported by a number of proposed dynamic PDP schemes. Ateniese et al. [14] built a scalable PDP scheme that supported the modification and appending of data. Erway et al. [11] built a scheme based on a skip list to support dynamic data. The solution developed by Wang et al. [10] was based on the MHT, but failed to maintain the balance of the MHT after data updates.
The above schemes focus on the scenes where users are honest and cloud servers are untrusted. Recently, some schemes (like [26] ) which are based on the non-reputable dynamic PDP framework have been proposed focusing on the scenes where the users are dishonest. The conventional data structures (like MHT) are not suitable for these schemes because of the synchronization problem. For example, Wang et al. [26] utilizes a monotonic dynamic structure index logic table (ILT) to solve the synchronization problem and realize the non-reputable goal.
All the existing PDP schemes utilize the challengeresponse model and random sampling, which allow users to verify their remote data at relatively low communication and computational costs. However, if very few blocks are damaged (e.g. if two among 1,000,000 blocks are lost), which are very difficult to find.
B. POR SCHEMES
Juels and Kaliski [13] introduced the first POR scheme. They used erasure codes and ''sentinel'' blocks in their protocol to ensure that the data on the remote storage server was retrievable. However, due to the use of sentinel blocks, their scheme only supported limited verification, and applied only to static data.
The POR scheme also uses the challenge-response model and random sampling, so that users can verify their remote data at low communication and computational costs. Additionally, it can also hold lost blocks via erasure codes, thus it provides a higher level of security compared to the PDP scheme.
Later, Juels and Kaliski [13] proposed a theory and application to improve the POR scheme that supports static data. Shacham and Waters [20] presented a compact proof of a retrievable scheme. Moreover, Cash et al. [21] developed a dynamic POR scheme based on ORAM that applied to dynamic data but incurred large computation and communication costs. Shi et al. [12] then proposed a practical dynamic POR scheme that could achieve comparable bandwidth overhead, but was restricted to updating individual data blocks.
III. PRELIMINARY INFORMATION A. MERKLE HASH TREE (MHT)
The MHT represents a data structure that is designed to effectively and safely verify the integrity of a data set [22] . A standard MHT is a balanced binary tree designed for static data that allows the user to compute the position of the leaf node on the path from root to leaf. Data update operations like ''insertion'' or ''deletion'' alter the original MHT structure. After several update operations, the MHT will become unbalanced, the path length from the root to each leaf becomes different, and it is no longer possible to compute the position in the same manner as in the static MHT. Below, we will discuss how to extend the MHT to support multi-data blocks updates.
B. SCAPEGOAT TREE
The scapegoat tree, which represents a self-balancing binary search tree, was created by Andersson [23] and refined by Galperin and Rivest [24] . It can be either weightbalanced or height-balanced. In this paper, we use the weightbalanced scapegoat tree. Let α denote a decimal and 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1. For any node x in a binary search tree, if size(left x ) ≤ α.size(x) and size(right x ) ≤ α.size(x) (where size(x) represents the number of nodes contained in the subtree of x, size(left x ) is the number of nodes contained in the left subtree of x, and size(right x ) is the number of nodes in the right subtree of x.), the tree is called α-weight balanced with a height of h α (n) = log 1/α n (n represents the number of nodes contained in the tree). If certain nodes are no longer balanced due to update operations such as insertion and deletion, then the highest node x that meets the condition of max(size(left x ), size(right x )) > α.size(x) is identified and the subtree is rebuilt with root ''x'', as described in the proof by Galperinet and Rivest [24] . The average time complexity of deleting and inserting operations in the scapegoat tree is O(log n) and the worst search time complexity is O(log n).
C. HOMOMORPHIC VERIFIABLE TAGS
The homomorphic verifiable tag was first proposed by Ateniese et al. [18] . And now some homomorphic signature based schemes have been proposed handling different problems [25] . For a message m, T m = T (m) (T (m) is a function to generate the tag of m) is the homomorphic tag. The homomorphic tag scheme is unforgeable. This means the probability of finding the data satisfying the condition of 
The homomorphic tag can significantly reduce the cost of communication in remote data verification. Later, we will demonstrate how to use homomorphic verifiable tags in our scheme.
D. ERASURE CODES
As to the message M = (m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n ), we define erasure codes to include two functions: encode :
→ n , where ''encode'' means after encoding n blocks yields m encoded blocks, and ''decode'' means that decoding yields the original message from the encoded blocks. If no more than d − 1 data blocks have been deleted, all the original messages are recovered. If the first n blocks in the encoded data are the same as the original blocks, the data is considered to be systematic.
IV. MODELS A. MULTI-DATA BLOCKS UPDATES MODEL
Our scheme consists of two parts, which are the cloud and the user. When the user stores data in the cloud, it requires the cloud to provide proof of the data's integrity.
Assume that the user data stored in the cloud is split into n data blocks, first, the n blocks are encoded with erasure code to support data retrievability, so there are m = (1 + c). n blocks after encoding. ''c'' is a constant and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. The data will be unrecoverable only when more than cn blocks are damaged. However, even a single block update can involve updating at least cn blocks. To make the update of the encoded data more practical, an erasure-coded hierarchical log structure can be imposed to prevent immediate updating upon writes. Consequently, the cloud recodes all the data blocks received after a certain number of updated blocks. The average complexity is thus O(log n) for each update operation. Here, we also build a structure to support simultaneous updates of multiple data blocks.
Since the erasure-coded hierarchical log structure delays the update of the whole data set, the data blocks may not be up-to-date and some erasure code may need to be encoded to obtain the original data. To obtain fresh blocks quickly, the version without erasure code denoted as Unencoded data is maintained by SGMHT. The version with erasure code is denoted as Encoded data, while a hierarchical log structure using the erasure code is built to maintain the update of encoded data, which is denoted as H . To this effect, the cloud stores the data blocks in three different buffers: Unencoded data, Encoded data and H . These buffers are depicted in detail in FIGURE. 5.Challenge generates the challenge query; 6.Proof generates the integrity proof of the data by challenge query and user data;
7.Verify verifies the proof of the integrity; The main interaction process is shown in FIGURE. 1.
B. SECURITY MODEL
We construct the security model (i.e., authenticity and retrievability) as previously described [12] , [21] . Authenticity. We utilize the following game between an adversary server S * , a challenger C, and an honest server S [12] , [21] .
1.Initialphase : C runs the KeyGen function to generate the key and then sends the public key to S * and S. S * chooses the data F, and C replayes with the initial metadata to S * and S.
2.Test : According to the update information and challenge information from S * , C sends an update query and challenge query to S and S * . S and S * will return the update proof to C and receive the verified result from C. This process can be executed in any polynomial times.
Definition 2: Our scheme satisfies the authenticity requirement if there exists no adversary with polynomial computing power that can forge a proof which is different from the real one returned from the server, and pass the verification process with non-negligible probability.
Retrievability. We defined the following game, as previously reported [12] , [21] .
1.Initialphase : C runs the KeyGen function to generate the key and sends the public key to S * . S * chooses the data F, and C replayes with the initial metadata to S * .
2.Queries: According to the update information and challenge information from S * , C sends an update query and challenge query to S * . S * returns an update proof to C and receives the verified result from C. This process can be executed in polynomial times.
3.Setup: S * chooses a series of updating information, according to these updating information, C sends the update query to S * and receive the update proof. C only records the right update that passed the verification and update the local metadata.
4.Challenge : According to the data of the final version obtained in step 3, C sends the challenge query to S * and S * responds with a proof. If the verification of the proof is accepted, then the adversary wins the game. C can repeat the challenge in any polynomial times. The goal is to extract the challenged data blocks from the adversary.
Definition 3: Our scheme satisfies retrievability requirements if the adversary cheats the client with non-negligible probability. In the same time, there exist a polynomial time extractor who has the ability to recover the original data from the adversary by issuing challenges in polynomial times.
V. PROPOSED SCHEME A. UNENCODED DATA MAINTENANCE SCHEME
To quickly obtain the fresh blocks, we maintain the unencoded buffer of data blocks in the cloud. The buffer is maintained by the balanced data structure, i.e. SGMHT.
SGMHT is essentially an extension of the MHT and scapegoat tree models. A standard MHT is a balanced binary tree designed for static data that allows the user to compute the position of the leaf node on the path from root to leaf. Data update operations like ''insertion'' or ''deletion'' change the original MHT structure. After several update operations, the MHT will become unbalanced and the path length from root to each leaf becomes different, so it is no longer possible to compute the position in the same manner as in the static MHT. The example shown in FIGURE. 2 reveals that after several insertions, the MHT becomes unbalanced and the position of node m 2 cannot be computed just as it was done in the static MHT.
In order to solve these problems, we first use an approach similar to a previously reported solution [11] in the extended VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Extending MHT with rank information. skip list. We extend the rank information in the MHT by adding the rank to the hash value of the node. The value of node i is {h i , r i }. For the leaf node, the value of h i = H (m i ), r i = 1. For the parent node N p = {h p , r p } whose child nodes are N 1 = {h 1 , r 1 } and N 2 = {h 2 , r 2 }, the value h p = h(h 1 h 2 r p ) and r p = r 1 + r 2 . After extending the rank information, we can verify the position of each data block via the authentication (auth) path from the leaf to root nodes and there is no need to maintain the original structure of the MHT. The extending MHT with rank information is depicted in FIGURE.2. Secondly, we use the balanced strategy based on a scapegoat tree to maintain the balance. The main reason to use the scapegoat tree is that the scapegoat tree is a self-balanced binary tree which is not based on rotation. The rotation will make the affected paths more complicated while updating the nodes. Further, it is hard to maintain the balance when multiple blocks are updated at the same time. The skip list used in [11] is also a structure that is neither based on rotation nor is it suitable for simultaneous multiple updating operations. Different from other self-balancing binary search trees which support the worst-case O(log n) lookup time, the scapegoat tree has no additional overhead per-node (e.g. ''colors'' or ''weights''). Accordingly, our SGMHT structure utilizes the balancing strategy of scapegoat tree.
In this scheme, we assume that the data F = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } stored on the server is maintained by the SGMHT, and the root value of the SGMHT N R = {h R , r R } is kept by the user for verification. The verification process is shown in FIGURE 3.
Generate Challenge. For the Challenge function, let I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c } be a location set of challenge data blocks, which is generated randomly, where i ⊆ [1, n] , n denotes the total number of data blocks and I is sent to the server as a challenge message. Generate Proof. After the server receives the challenge message, it runs the Proof function, generates the auth path of each challenge block according to I = {i 1 , i 1 , . . . , i c }, and the auth path is the value sequence of each brother node in the path from the leaves of the challenge blocks to the root. The server merges the auth path and the challenge blocks as proof P auth = (path, {m i | i ∈ I }) and sends it to the client.
Verify Proof. The client uses the Verify function to verify the proof P auth that is got from the server. The challenge Below, we will show how to manage multi-data blocks modification, insertion and deletion through FIGURE. 5.
Multi-data Blocks Modification. We assume that I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c } is the position set which the user wants to modify, and M = {m i | i ∈ I } needs to change to M = {m i | i ∈ I } . The client runs the GenUpdate function to generate the update query update = (modify, {(m i , i) | i ∈ I }) and sends it to the server. The server runs ExecUpdate according to the update query, first obtaining the verification information Pauth of all the blocks to be modified, updating the values from leaves to root, securing the new root hash value h * R , and then returning the update proof P update = {P auth , h * R } to the client. The client executes VerifyUpdate according to the proof. The first step is to run the verify(P auth , I ) function to check the original blocks; the second step is to use M = {m i | i ∈ I } to replace the leaf values in P auth and compute the new root hash value h R , ultimately comparing it with h * R . If they are the same, the proof is verified to pass and the root value of the local SGMHT is updated in the client.
Multi-data Blocks Insertion. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c } be the position set that user wants to insert. Inserting data block (m i , i), i ∈ I means inserting m i after the ith block. If inserting consecutive blocks, then i is same and the blocks are denoted by m i1 , m i2 , . . . , m ic . The client runs the GenUpdate to obtain Update = (insert, {m i , i | i ∈ I }). After receiving Update, the server uses ExecUpdate to update and generate the proof. The difference between the ''modification'' and ''insertion'' operations is that ''insert'' makes the SGMHT become imbalanced. In this case, we use the scapegoat tree balance strategy to perform some partial rebuilding to retain the balance.
Assume M * = {m * i } is the set of blocks to be rebuilt. As our first step, the server authenticates the information P auth of the set of blocks M * ∪ {m i |i ∈ I } and obtains the new root hash value h * R after finishing the insertion operations and rebuilds the data set for balance. In the second step, the server generates the update proof P updates = {P auth , h * R } and sends it to the client. The client runs the VerifyUpdate process. P auth is verified by Verify(P auth , I ), then inserts the corresponding data blocks after the leaf nodes in Pauth based on update = (insert, {(m i , i)|i ∈ I }). If there is imbalance, then partial rebuilding is performed according to the balance strategy. The third step is to obtain the new root hash value h R and compare it with h * R in the update proof. If they are same, then the proof is verified to pass and the root value of the local SGMHT is updated in the client. An example of maintaining the balance during insertion is shown in FIGURE. 6.
Multi-data Blocks Deletion. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c } be the position set the user wants to delete. The client runs GenUpdate to generate the update query update = (delete, I ). The server runs the ExecUpdate function after receiving the query. The deleting operation may also lead to imbalance in a similar manner as the insertion, so balance must be carefully maintained. Suppose M * = {m * i } is the set of blocks which need rebuilding. First, the server authenticates the information P auth of the set of blocks VOLUME 7, 2019 after completing the deletion operations and rebuilding the data set for balance. Second, the server generates the update proof P update = {P auth , h * R } and sends it to the client. The client runs the VerifyUpdate process. After verifying P auth by Verify (P auth,I ), the corresponding leaf nodes of data blocks based on update = (delete, I ) are deleted. After deletion, if there exists imbalance, then partial rebuilding is performed according to the balance strategy. Finally, the new root hash value h R is obtained and compared with h * R in the update proof. If they are same, then it is verified to pass and the root value of the local SGMHT is updated in the client. An example of the deletion and balance maintenance operation is shown in FIGURE. 7.
B. ENCODED DATA MAINTENANCE SCHEME
In this section, we will describe how the cloud server-side utilizes the Encoded data blocks and H to manage the delayed update of stored data as well as the retrievability of multiple data blocks.
The H has log n + 1 levels, whose level is either empty or full with update information of 2 i blocks, where i(i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , log n ) indicates the level number, and the updated information of the 2 i blocks is erasure-coded to enable each level to maintain its own retrievability. While updating a single block, if level 0 is empty, it is included; otherwise, all updated blocks with levels less then i are recoded into the ith level, which i is the first empty level. After collecting 2 i update blocks, the ith level is rebuilt at an average complexity of O(log n ) (FIGURE. 8). For multiple block updates, there is no need to individually rebuild the update blocks in each level. We can compute the final status and encode the blocks to their target level. Suppose there are x blocks in H and m data blocks to be inserted, after the updates, we can acquire the target status by the binary digit of y = x + m, if the ith digit is 1, which means the i − 1 level is nonempty. We can thus fill the blocks in the nonempty levels in sequence and recode the level with block changes, which reduces the amount of recoding necessary.
Integrity Verification. The integrity verification of the erasure-coded data is slightly different from that of original data. Although the whole data is dynamic, both the blocks in H and Encoded data are locally static, and do not change until they are rebuilt, thus we can build a standard MHT to ensure the authenticity of blocks in H and Encoded data. In every nonempty level of H , we can build a standard MHT to maintain the integrity of blocks in the level. If the level needs to be rebuilt, then the MHT is rebuilt as well. Suppose {h Ri | i ∈ [0, k)} is the set of the root nodes values in H . The client stores the combined hash value h H = h(h R0 h R1 . . . h Rk−1 ), the root hash value h c of the MHT built on Encoded data, and the number of blocks n c . Because the encoding of each level in H is independent, while sampling randomly, each level must be sampled separately. The integrity proof includes the sample blocks in each level of H , Encoded data, and the auth information in each MHT. The client uses the information in the proof to compute the MHT root hash value {h Ri |i ∈ [0, k)} in H and then computes the combined hash value h H = h(h R0 h R1 . . . h Rk−1 ) to compare it against local value h H . The client then gets the hash value h H new by using the auth information from Encoded data and compares it with the local value h c . If all the comparisons are correct, then it is verified to pass. Data Update and Proof. As the encoded data blocks are on a delay by using the log structure, the update information is saved with the data blocks in H . The ''modify'' block information in H is recorded as m modify = (m i modify i t), where ''m i '' denotes the data block after modification, ''modify'' is the update type, ''i'' is the position of the data block, and ''t'' is the time stamp indicating different batches of updates. The ''inserted'' block is recorded as m insert = (m i insert i t) and the ''deleted'' block as m delete = (delete i t). Suppose M * = {(m * li , l, i)} is the set of all the recoded blocks after updating and li is the ith block in the l th level. After updating, the server sends M * , the hash value set h 
C. EFFICIENT DATA MAINTENANCE SCHEME
In this subsection, we describe our use of homomorphic verifiable tags to extend our basic construction.
Using homomorphic verifiable tags can reduce the communication costs of the update and verification operations. Essentially, this involves using homomorphic tags instead of the data blocks themselves to verify and then authenticate the tags. They can then be used to verify a combined block and check whether the blocks on the server are correct.
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When using homomorphic tags, the data maintained by the SGMHT/MHT will be the tags of data blocks. They ensure the tags' authenticity instead of that of the blocks. The data blocks in the proof are replaced by their tags, which are much smaller. After verifying the integrity of the tags, the homogeneity of the tags is used to authenticate the combined block.
Suppose M = {m 1 , m 2 . . . , m c } is the set of data blocks to be verified, T = {T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T c } is the set of homomorphic tags of the blocks, and A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a c } is a set of c random numbers. According to the homogeneity of the homomorphic tags,
Based on this formula, only a combined block c i=1 a i m i with the tags is necessary to complete the data block verification.
The reason that random numbers are used is to resist replay attacks. Homomorphic verifiable tags can also be used to rebuild the ensure-coded blocks in H . During ensure-coded block recoding, the client recodes the corresponding tags in the same manner so the client can obtain the new tags which match the blocks after recoding.
1) USING HOMOMORPHIC TAGS IN UNENCODED DATA
Following Wang's [10] method, we assume that the data stored on the server consists of n blocks, m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n , and m i ∈ Z p , where p is a large prime number. We let map e : G×G → G T be a Bilinear map, and the hash function H : {0, 1} * → G is considered as a random language machine. We designated g as a generator of G and h a cryptographic function.
The data initialization phase:
The client generates a random α ← Z P . Let υ ← g a , output public key pk = (υ, spk) and private key sk = (α, ssk).
← SigGen(sk, F) :
The client generates the signature and homomorphic tags before uploading the data to the server. It generates a random µ ← G and outputs the signature σ i ← (H (m i ).µ m i ); the signature set of data blocks is = (σ i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We build the SGMHT for verification based on the tag H (m i )(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and output metadatathe signature α : sig(H (R)) ← (H (R)) α of the root R of the SGMHT and send the metadata-{F, , sig sk (H (R))} to the server.
The verification of the data integrity phase: 1.GenChallenge(c, n) : The client or the third-party auditor generates the challenge query, in which c is the data blocks to be challenged and n is the total number of data blocks. First, a set of C elements is randomly selected.
Then output ν i ← B ⊆ Z P for every i ∈ I and the server obtains the challenge query: chal = {(i, ν i )|i ∈ I } 2.GenProof (F, , chal) : After receiving the challenge query chal = {(i, ν i )|i ∈ I }, the server will output the following:
The server also provides the verifier with the information i , i.e. the node siblings on the path from the leaves H (m i ), i ∈ I to the root R of the SGMHT. After merging all the repeated paths, the server outputs the information and the corresponding proof: P = {µ, σ {H (m i )|i ∈ I }, , sig sk (H (R))}.
3.VerifyProof (pk, chal, P) : After receiving the corresponding proof, the client generates the R and compares it to the metadata stored locally, if they are the same then they are authenticated by checking e(sig(H (R)), g)
If the authentication fails, the client outputs FALSE; otherwise, the client checks: e(σ, g) 
2. VerifyUpdate(P update , update) : Upon receiving the proof from the server, the client generates root R by ({ i , H (m i )}|i ∈ I ), and compares it to the local metadata, if they are the same then check the following formula:
If the formula is true, the client generates the new root R by ({ i , H (m i )}|i ∈ I ), and generates sig sk (H (R )), which is sent to the server to replace the old one. Meanwhile, the R is sent to the third-party auditor.
Multi-data Blocks Insertion. We assume that I = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i c |i ∈ [1, n]} is the position set which the user wants to insert. Inserting data block {(m * i , i)|i ∈ I } means inserting m * i after the ith block. If inserting consecutive blocks, then i is the same and the blocks are denoted by
The signature of the new block is generated as follows:
To generate the update information update = (inset,
and send it to the server. Assume M = {m i } is the block set to be rebuilt, so should contain the information of the blocks set M ∪ {m * i |i ∈ I } 1. ExecUpdate(F, , update) : The server executes the inserting operation upon receiving the query:
(1) The server stores the information of the new data block {(m * i , i)|i ∈ I }, and adds the new leaf nodes h(H (m * i )) after the leaf node h(H (m i )). (2) The server adds the new signature σ * and outputs the new signature set * . (3) The server performs inserting operation (including partial rebuilding) and generates the new root R through the updated SGMHT, then sends the following proof to the client.
2. VerifyUpdate(P update , update) : Upon receiving the proof from the server, the client generates root R by and H (m i ), and compares it to the local metadata per the following formula:
If the formula is true, the client generates the new root R by , H (m i ) and H (m * i ), then generates sig sk (H (R )) which is sent to the server to replace the old one. Meanwhile, R is sent to the third-party auditor.
Multi-data Blocks Deletion. The data deletion operation is similar to data insertion, so we will not describe it in detail here.
2) USING HOMOMORPHIC TAGS IN ENCODED DATA
This construction contains data initialization, data integrity verification and data updating.
The data initialization phase consists of two steps, KeyGen and Init.
1.KenGen(1 k ) : is the key generation phase, in which the client randomly generates a key pair for the signature (spk, ssk), pk = (N , g), N = pq, p, q are big prime numbers and g is a high digit of Z * N . 2.Init(F, β, sk) : In this step, we use erasure codes to decode the data blocks, F stands for data and β stands for the size of every data block. We assume that there are n data blocks (m i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n) after decoding. Each homomorphic tag of the data block is T i = g m i mod N , which is used to build the MHT. The output metadata-the signature α : sig sk (h R ) ← (h R ) α of the root R of the MHT is obtained and the metadata is sent to the server.
There are three main steps in the data integrity verification phase:
1.GenChallenge(c, n) : The client or the third-party auditor generate the challenge query, in which c are the data blocks to be challenged, and n l is the total number of data blocks in every level of H . First, a set of c elements in every level of H is randomly selected.
Then ν i ← B ⊆ Z P is output for every i ∈ I and the server receives the challenge query:
GenProof (F, , chal) : After receiving the challenge query chal = {(i, ν i )|i ∈ I }, for challenged blocks in every level of H , the server outputs the combined value:
The server also provides the verifier with the information i i.e. are the node siblings on the path from the leaves T (m li ) to the root R l of the MHT in every level of H . After merging all the repeated paths, the server outputs the information and the corresponding proof:
where R stands the combined value of all the root R l in H . 3.VerifyProof (pk, chal, P) : Upon receiving the corresponding proof, the client generates the R l and the combined value R , then compares it to the locally-stored metadata R, if they are the same, they are authenticated by checking the following:
If so, the client outputs TRUE; otherwise FALSE. Data block updating. This is the most complicated step, in which code scheme based Fast Fourier Transform(FFT) is employed just the same way as previously described [12] . Homomorphic tags, however, are just constructed to improve the efficiency of the integrity verification phase, which means the updating operation is essentially the same as the previous basic encoded data maintenance scheme. So, we just provide a high level intuition of the process here. Specifically, let c (i) denotes a partial bit-reversal function that reverses the least significant c bits of an integer i. let c (x) denotes a partial bit-reversal permutation, where x represents a vector; ω represents the 2nd primitive root of unity in an appropriate finite field; H l denotes the lth level of H , which contains 2 l data blocks, that are encoded into 2 l+1 data blocks. The original data can thus be recovered with the knowledge of any 2 l × 2 l blocks. x l is a vector consisting of the original data blocks in the lth level, and F l is the 2 l Fourier transform matrix:
is in full rank according to the proof described by Shacham and Waters [20] . By the erasure code encoding, the final data blocks must be involved in the recoding of each level. Thus, all updates of blocks are presented in the form of written blocks, then write them into the target positions and recode according to the update information.
1.GenUpdate(m new , sk, update) : It denotes an update request, in which m new is the block to be updated, sk is the private key of the user, and update is the update information. The client computes the tag T new = g m new modN of the block to be updated, and sends the tags, blocks to be updated and update the information to the server.
2.ExecUpdate(m new , update, H ) : Upon receiving the update query, the server fetches all the tags of the blocks that need to be rebuilt and the root value R i of the MHT in the level that does not need rebuilding. M denotes all the blocks needing to be rebuilt and computed:
The server then sends the update proof updateProof = {{T (m li )}, M } to the client, and updates H . The tags of the blocks that need to be rebuilt are rebuilt.
3.VerifyUpdate(updateProof , pk, m new ) : After receiving the update proof from the server, the client computes the root values of MHT in the levels that need to be rebuilt. It combines them with other root values of MHT in the levels that do not need to be rebuilt, then outputs R . Then, R is compared with the local R, and if they are same, check:
If all are correct, then return ''accept'' and update the local value R.
VI. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) AUTHENTICITY
In this section, we analyze the safety of our proposed scheme under the security model defined in Section IV.B. We consider an RSA encryption scheme to be used in this analysis.
Theorem 1: If the RSA encryption scheme is CPA-secure and the signature scheme is strongly unforgeable in the random oracle model, the proposed scheme can satisfy the authenticity requirement (Definition 2).
Proof: We construct a simulator S * to emulate an honest server as follows:
1.S * generates public keys and private keys via the KenGen function.
2.When a client executes the GenUpdate function and Challenge function, the client sends the update query and challenge query to S * , and S * forwards it to the server.
3.When S * executes the ExecUpdate function, it generates the update proof P by itself.
4.When S * executes the Proof function, it generates the challenge proof P by itself.
5.When the client receives P , it executes the Verify function.
If S * wins the above game, it means that the proof is accepted by the client. Since P is not generated by the server, a forge can be constructed to attack the signature scheme. An attacker A is constructed as follows:
A calls S * . When S * executes KenGen, A does as the scheme's specification does. When S * wins, there are two cases:
1. S * constructs a valid message H (R) and signature Sig sk (H (R)), therefore A outputs H (R). Since S * generates H (R) by itself, where H (R) is not signed by the server, and S * passes the verification, Sig sk (H (R)) must be a valid signature of the server. It means the signature scheme is not secure (by the assumption).
2. S * gets a new R such that H (R ) = H (R), and H is a random function in the oracle model, so the probability that H (R ) = H (R) is negligible. Thus, Theorem 1 is proven.
2) RETRIEVABILITY
Following previous studies [10] , we consider F after ρ − rate Reed-Solomon coding. We first define the Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) problem in the same manner as Wang et al. [10] .
Definition 4 (CDH Problem):
The CDH problem is illustrated as this. Given g, g x , g y ∈ G, in which x, y ∈ Z P is unknown, to compute g xy .
If there is no t-time algorithm can solve the CDH problem with non-negligible probability , the (t, ) − CDH assumption in G holds. The scheme satisfies the necessary retrievability if any cheating server which could convince a verification algorithm that a file F is stored by it, is indeed storing this file. In other words, that it hands over the file F to an extractor algorithm which uses the proof-of-retrievability protocol to interact with it. The adversary (i.e. cheating server) is defined as -admissible if it can convince the verifier -fraction of selected challenges.
Theorem 2: Following Wang's approach [10] , assume a cheating server on a file F containing n blocks behaves well in the above sense, namely -admissible. Let ω be a fraction related with variables of ρ, n, etc. Then, assume that − ω is non-negligible and positive, There is a high probability to recuperate a ρ-fraction of the encoded data blocks in O(n/( − ρ)) interactions with the cheating server.
Proof: The verification of the theorem is the same as that described by Wang et al. [10] , accordingly, the details of the proof is omitted here.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We have proposed two data maintenance schemes for unencoded data and encoded data in subsection V.C. Specifically, we utilize BLS signature for the unencoded data scheme and RSA signature for the encoded scheme. Indeed both the BLS-based and RSA-based homomorphic tags are suitable for the unencoded data scheme. Concretely, the BLS-based MHT leaves h(H (m i )) can be directly replaced with h(g m i ) (RSA-based). Now the verifier first deals with the authentication task of g m i and then computes the combined signature. In this way, the server can eliminate the computation of the combined signature, as a trade of, the verifier would incur lager computation overhead. Compared with the RSA signatures (e.g. 1024bits), the BLS construction can offer shorter homomorphic signatures (e.g., 160 bits), which is a desirable advantage for our scheme. Furthermore, the size of the challenge and response is shortest by using BLS signature. Therefore, BLS-based construction is utilized in our unencoded scheme. For the encoded data scheme, the RSAbased construction which can support variable sized blocks and reduce the server's computation overhead is a more reasonable choice.
TABLE 1 provides computation complexities for every single updating operation as well as storage complexities for both the client and the server. ''n'' in the table, represents the number of data blocks stored by the server and ''t'' indicates a consecutive t blocks. The complexity for one data block could be captured by substituting t with 1. ''Y '' indicates supporting and ''N '' indicates not supporting.
We conducted our experiment in a system based on OpenStack, which is a very famous open source platform with great flexibility. We only used the OpenStack Object Storage section in our experiments. The experimental test system consists of a server and a client, whose configurations are depicted in TABLE 2. Specifically, the experiments are conducted in a setting: 16GB of outsourced data with 16KB data blocks. All the results of the experiments are averages of 100 trials.
The results presented in FIGURE. 9 reveal that the size of update proofs between our scheme and the traditional method (update by a single block one at a time) utilized by the schemes of Erway et al. [11] and Shi et al. [12] is different when updating the randomized data blocks (the total number of data blocks is 1 million). As the number of update blocks increases, our scheme reduces the communication costs between the client and server significantly.
The impact of insertion and deletion at a random position is very minimal to the balance of the MHT (i.e. the binary search tree by random insertion is effectively balanced) utilized in the scheme of Shi et al. [12] , so the size of the proofs generated by SGMHT is actually similar to that of the MHT with random location updating. We ran an experiment in the case of continuous insertion for a fixed location, which seriously affects the balance of MHT. The comparison of the proof sizes under our scheme and the traditional, separate updating when inserting multiple blocks in the fixed location is shown in FIGURE. 10. The results indicate that our scheme considerably outperforms random insertion.
Regarding the retrievability support, FIGURE. 11 shows that our scheme can reduce the number of recoding erasure encoded blocks during multiple blocks updating.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed a novel provable data integrity scheme that supports simultaneous update of multiple data blocks. First, a balanced data structure SGMHT is constructed, it is a new data structure combined with the MHT and the scapegoat tree. In this data structure, the rank information is added to each node of the MHT, and the balance of the MHT after multiple updates is maintained by using the rotation-free and self-balancing strategy of the scapegoat tree. Accordingly, SGMHT can effectively support simultaneous multiple data blocks updating. Second, an erasure-coded hierarchical log structure is used to manage delayed-update of multiple data blocks as well as the retrievability of the data. The erasure code makes it possible to restore all the data in order to achieve a higher level of security even if there is a loss of data blocks. The hierarchical log structure is used for multi-block delay update to ensure efficiency. Ultimately, the homomorphic tag is utilized in the scheme to reduce the amount of data transmitted to further enhance the efficiency of the scheme. Experiments and safety analysis verified the efficiency and security of the scheme.
Based on the work described in this paper, multi-user access and batch auditing for update of multi-data blocks can be further explored in future work. 
